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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
'\TESTERN ENGINEERS, INC.}~D'V ARDS AND KELCEY,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs
.
STA TE OF UTAH, by and through
its ROAD COJ.\TMISSION,
Defendant and Respondent.

,.

1

.
)

Case No.
10919

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF CASE
Appellants' action originally included a number
of claims for extra compensation under a written
"Agreement for Engineering Services". Before pretrial
all had been settled except a claim for damages on
account of delays during performance of the contract.
At the pretrial conference, held three and one-half
years after commencement of the action, respondent
ornlly moved for summary judgment, and thereafter
both parties filed formal motions and affidavits. On
1

April 25, 1967, the trial court denied appellants' motion
for summary judgment, granted respondent's, and entered judgment dismissing the action.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants Western Engineers, Inc., a Utah corporation, and Edwards and Kelcey, a New Jersey
partnership, entered into a joint venture arrangement
(R. 80) and will be referred to herein as the "joint
venture." By letter dated November 18, 1957, they
sent respondent (hereinafter called the "Road Commission") a proposal for the performance of engineering services for 18.6 miles of Highway Interstate 15,
the services to include surveys, preliminary design, subsurface investigations, final design, preparation of contract plans and specifications, right-of-way maps and
shop drawings, and field consultations during construction (R. 75-77). The proposal contained, among others,
the following undertakings:
"After approval of preliminary design by the
Commission and U. S. Bureau of Public Roads,
complete final design and prepare plans, specifications and contract documents for four construction contracts to be let by the Commission.

* * * ,,
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".Final design will be in accordance with Road
Commission standards and design criteria for
interstate highways approved by U. S. Bureau
of Public Roads" (R. 76).
"'¥ e will complete all contract plans and specifications within 9 months after notice to proceed,
provided that there is not more than a two-week
interval between submission of the various phases
of the design to the Commission and approval
of the above designs by the Commission and the
Bureau of Public Roads. A time schedule showing completion time for each phase of the work
is attached." (R. 77).
"The final fee will be three and forty-five
hundredths percent ( 3.45%) of the total cost
of construction. For the purpose of the progress
payments, the fee is estimated to be 3.45% of
an estimated construction cost of $19,000,000"
(R. 77).
'¥ith the letter the joint venture sent detailed
information on the qualifications of its principals. The
biographical data makes it clear that the joint venturers,
their "associated" corporations, and their managers
were experienced and knowledgeable, having performed
a wide variety of services in the field of civil engineering
on federal and state highways, bridges and other structures; toll turnpikes and facilities; traffic problems and
parking facilities; flood control and drainage; water
supply and sanitation; dams, reservoirs; foundation and
soils; transit; railroads; subways and tunnels. During
the five years preceding submission of the proposal,
Edwards and Kelcey had processed preliminary design
on highway projects with an estimated construction
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cost of $7 50,000,000, and had prepared final design
and contract plans for highway projects totaling $120,000,000. Other highway design had been done by the
associated corporations, Engineering Service Corporation and Morrison-Maierle, Inc. (R. 80-89).
As a result of the proposal, the joint venture and
the Road Commission entered into an "Agreement for
Engineering Services" dated February 21, 1967 (Ex.
D-1,

R. 60-70).

The contract recited that the Road Commission
"in cooperation with the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads''
proposed to construct a portion of the Interstate 15
under three separate project designations totalling 18.6
miles, and that the Road Commission "does not have
and cannot recruit an adequate engineering staff to
design said project within the specified time limit, and
at the same time design, construct, and maintain the
other highways within the State of Utah which the
Road Commission is required to design, construct, and
maintain." Among the contract provisions were the
following:
"This pi:,oject is part of the Federal-Aid system, and as such, it is understood that the plans
and designs must be approved by the Bureau
of Public Roads in accordance with the usual
procedure. The consulting engineer will cooperate with the Bureau of Public Roads at all
times through the Road Commission, and will
furnish such data, estimates, plans, breakdown
of quantities, etc., as may be required from time
to time by the Bureau of Public Roads which
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will transmit such requests through the Road
Commission" ( R. 62, Item le).
Contract Item 11 ( R. 62) required the joint venture to prepare general and detailed features of the
location of the project together with standard drawings, standard specifications and other similar data
furnished or to be furnished by the Road Commission,
"or as may be modified from time to time and all in
accordance with the approved methods of AASMO
design criteria and the standards the Bureau of Public
Roads shall apply."
"All surveys, designs, plans, schedules, progress and supervision will be subject to the approval of the director of the highways of the
Road Commission." (I tern I le, R. 63).
In Item IV (R. 65) of the contract the Road
Commission agreed to:
"Furnish to the Consulting Engineer, department standards, specifications, and regulations of the Road Commission applying to projects of a similar nature and other available
information including preliminary plans, survey
data, photogrammetric maps, estimates, and
other such data prepared for this project;** * "
The Road Commission was also to guaranty access to lands deemed necessary for the performance
of the consulting engineer's work; provide printing
and reproduction of construction contract documents;
provide cloth layout sheets for the preparation of final
plans; give full consideration to all sketches, estimates,
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working drawings, specifications, proposals, and other
documents laid before it by the consulting engineer;
and "inform the Consulting Engineer of its decision
within a reasonable time so as not to interrupt or delay
the work of the Consulting Engineer" (R. 65).
The consulting engineer agreed to accept as "Final
compensation" for all services outlined in Paragraphs
I through V a percentage fee equaling 3.45% of the
total construction cost, but not exceeding $862,500.
Paragraph Vle provided for additional compensation for services "beyond the scope" of Item II, or
"if the Consulting Engineer is required to perform
extra services or make changes in work already satisfactorily performed in accordance with the direction
of the Road Commission." But the paragraph contained
no provision for additional compensation as a result
of delays, and Paragraph IXd of the General Conditions ( R. 69) provided:
"The consulting engineer agrees to prosecute
the work continuously and diligently, and that
no charges or claims for damages will be made
by them for any delay or hindrances, of any
cause whatsoever, during the progress of anJJ
portion of services specified in this agreement.
Such delays or hindrances, if any, shall be compensated for by an extension of time for such
reasonable period that the Road Commission
may decide." (Emphasis added.)
An examination of the contract makes it apparent
that the work to be performed by the joint venture
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required submission of numerous plans and drawings
to the Road Commission, and its submission of them
in turn to the Bureau of Public Roads. Approval could
not be expected to be automatic; reworking and resubmission of plans and drawings must have been anticipated by the parties.
It took the joint venture three years to complete
the contract, after which it claimed its increased time
for performance was caused by the Road Commission's
failure to process various preliminary designs, plans,
and drawings within a reasonable time; its slowness
in determining clearances of structures over railroads;
and the inability of the Road Commission and Bureau
of Public Roads to "come to decisions" (R. 152, 169171).

The joint venture has recognized that there was
no single, long-continued delay. The affidavit of Mr.
J. R. Neville, annexed to the plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment set out at least four separate instances, and pointed out that there were various delays
with respect to designs of the 37 structures included
in the contract (R. 151-152). That the joint venture
is relying upon a number of individual and unrelated
delays, rather than a single one, is also borne out by
the affidavit of Jack Leonard, annexed to the appellants' motion (R. 168-175).
There is a dispute with respect to responsibility
for the various delays. A memorandum from David
L. Sargent, the Road Commission's chief structural
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engineer, with respect to approval of structure designs
is annexed to Mr. Sargent's affidavit in support of
respondent's motion for summary judgment (R. 102105). It is apparent that there are disputes concerning
a number of factual matters surrounding individual
delays over a long period of time, some of which are
claimed to be the responsibility of the joint venture
and some of the Road Commission; and that the dispute
sought to be litigated in this action is the very kind
the parties sought to avoid by including a provision
in the contract that the Consulting Engineer would not
be entitled to charges or damages for delays "from any
,,
cause w hatsoever.
After the case had been set for trial, it became
apparent that the basis for appellants' claim for extra
compensation for delays should be ascertained prior
to trial. Accordingly, a pre-trial conference was held
at which appellants conceded they had no evidence
that the Road Commission had exercised any "fraud,
malice or wilful intent to delay the plaintiff in the
completion of the contract" (R. 53), which left for
determination only the question of whether the various
delays, added together, could be deemed to be so "unreasonable" that the "no damage" clause would not
apply to them.
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ARGUMENT

I
APPELLANTS' HECOVERY FOR DELAYS
IS PRECLUDED BY THE "NO DAl\ilAGE"
CLAUSE.
The basic dispute between appellants and respondent is over construction of Paragraph IXd of the
General Conditions of the contract:
"The Consulting Engineer [appellants] agrees
to prosecute the work continuously and diligently, and that no charges or claims for damages
will be made by them for any delay or hindrances,
of any cause whatsoever, during the progress of
any portion of services specified in this agreement. Such delays or hindrances, if any, shall be
compensated for by an extension of time for such
reasonable period that the Road Commission
may decide." (Emphasis added.)
Appellants contend that the paragraph is "ambiguous"
and that a trial should be had at which a judge or jury
could take evidence as to what the parties intended.
Respondent takes the positon that the paragraph's
meaning-though broad-is plain.
"No damage" clauses of varying breadth and severity have been used and litigated for many years. By
far the greater number of courts hold them to be valid
and enforceable, and to preclude recovery of extra compensation or damages for delays encountered during
contract performance. Although a few jurisdictions
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have held the provisions inapplicable in special types of
cases, respondent has been unable to find a single case
awarding damages under circumstances analogous to
those relied upon by appellants.
In an early case this court held damages for delays
were not recoverable under a contract providing only
for an extension of time for delays, even though a "no
damage" stipulation was not included. In a later case
the court applied a "no damage" clause to prevent
recovery of damages from delays resulting from actions
of a third party.
The first case was Russell v. Bothwell & Swaner
Co., et al., 57 Utah 362, 194 Pac. 1109 (1920), involving an agreement between a subcontractor and a prime
contractor which contained a provision that if the subcontractor was delayed in the completion or prosecution
of the work:
"By the act, neglect, or default of the owner
or by any damage caused by fire or other casualty
for which the (sub }contractor is not responsible,
or by general strike or lockout caused by acts of
employees, beyond the control of the (sub }contractor, then the time herein specified for the
completion of the work may be extended for a
period equivalent to the time lost by reason of
any or all of the causes aforesaid * * * "
The trial court awarded damages to the subcontractor on the ground that the prime contractor, by
itself delaying the work, had failed to perform the conditions of the contract.

10

This court reversed, taking the view that the
parties intended the prescribed remedy to be the sole
remedy for delay. The court said:
"There is no testimony that the delay was the
result of fraudulent, malicious, capricious, or
unreasonable acts or conduct on the part of the
defendant compa,ny to delay or harass the plaintiff in the prosecution of the work. On the contrary, the testimony tends to show that it was
the earnest desire of defendant company that the
work be prosecuted with all reasonable dispatch.
The legal question therefore before this court
for review is: can the plaintiff, by reason of the
provisions of the contract, recover for the loss
of time or delay caused by said defendant?"
The answer was "no." The decision is precedent
in this case because the contract was construed as if it
contained a "no damage" clause, and the limitation on
recovery was held to be binding in the absence of fraud
or wilful conduct for the purpose of delaying or hindering the other party, no such conduct having been claimed
by the appellants in this case.
The second case, Corporation of President of Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Hartford Accident and indemnity Co., et al., 98 Utah 297, 95 P.2d
736 ( 1939), involved a contract provision that the
church would not be held responsible for damage incurred through the fault of any other contractor employed by it and that should the contractor be delayed
in the prosecution of the work by reason of the above
cause, or through the owner, the time of completion
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shall be extended for a period equivalent to the time
lost.
The contractor sought damages from the church
because of delays resulting from the failure of another
contractor to provide materials as needed. In construing
the "no damage" clause, this court did not question
either the scope of the clause or length of the delay,
but said:
"As between Child & Co. and the Church these
provisions constitute an agreement by Child &
Co. not to sue the Church for damages due to
delay caused by another contractor, its remedy
being to secure an extension of time in order to
avoid liability for failure timely to complete the
work. In certain old decisions courts have held
that an agreement not to sue could not be set up
as a defense to an action for damages. If the
party did sue and obtained damages, the party
he ~greed not to sue could only sue for the breach
of the contract not to sue, and could recover
back the damages and other costs incurred because of suit. But disregarding an agreement
not to sue results in circuity and multiplicity of
actions which we shall avoid by denying Child
& Co.'s action against the Church. * * * "
A great majority of the courts in other jurisdictions
have held "no damage" clauses to preclude recovery of
damages for delays.

Psaty & Fuhrman, Inc., v. Housing Authority
of the City of Providence, 76 R.1. 87, 68 A.2d 32, 10

A.L.R.2d 789 ( 1949), is a well-reasoned case pointing
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out the anomaly of applying a "no damage" clause
only to delays which may be said to be "reasonable."
The action was brought by a contractor against the
housing authority for damages resulting from authority's having unreasonably hindered or delayed the contractor's performance. The court did not regard the
length of the delays or their effect on performance as
material to its decision, saying:
"The no damage clause in this contract expressly states that the contractor shall not recover
damages because of hindrance or delay from
any cause in the progress of the work 'whether
such delay be avoidable or unavoidable.' The
language of this provision, though broad in
scope, is not ambiguous. As the contract provides
for an extension of time if requested by the contractor, it is obvious that the object of the clause
was to protect the Authority in an undertaking
of such magnitude against the vexatious question,
in perhaps innumerable instances, whether any
particular delay could have been reasonably
avoided by the Authority. Had there been no
such provision in the contract, the Authority
would have been liable on the principle of an
implied covenant if unreasonable delay were
proven, that is, delay that might reasonably have
been avoided in carrying out its part of the contract. * * *
"The contractor in effect argues that the clause
under consideration means the Authority is
excusable for reasonable delay only. This construction of the no damage clause would subject
the Authority to the inquiry in all instances of
delay whether a reasonable person would have
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acted differently, thus raising the very question
that the clause intended to avoid. In the absence
of any claim of concealment, misrepresentation
or fraud, the contractor by such construction of
the no damage clause cannot render meaningless
an express condition of the contract which it
knowingly and freely accepted. As was observed
by the Supreme Court in Wells Bros Co. v.
United States, 254 U.S. 83, at page 87, 41 S.
Ct. 34, at page 35, 65 L.Ed. 148: 'men who take
million dollar contracts for government buildings are neither un~ophisticated nor careless.' "

Cunningham Bros. Inc. v. 1'he City of Waterloo,

254 Iowa 659, 117 N.W.2d 46 (1962), was an action
brought by a contractor for additional compensation,
part of which was based upon delays of the city. The
contract contained two clauses relating to delay: first,
that in event of specified delays the engineer would
decide upon the time for completion which would compensate for the delay; second, that the contractor would
have no right against the city on account of delay in
prosecution of the work but would have extra time for
completion. In holding that the contractor could not
recover in the face of the "no damage" clause the
Supreme Court of Iowa said:
"Appellee also attempts to eliminate the 'no
damage' clause by contending that such clause
refers only to such delays as were contemplated
by the parties and that the delay in making the
site available was not so contemplated. Was the
failure of the appellant to make the site available to the appellee on the commencing date
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such as was contemplated by the parties? \Ve
think it was. It will be observed that the contract,
and included docqments, specifically provide that
any delay upon the part of the appellant, or
other contractors, shall entitle appellee to such
extension of time as will compensate for such
delay. Delays that are known or expected to
happen would ordinarily be considered in the
fixing of the dates for starting and completing
of the work. It is for the purpose of providing
for situations that may perchance arise that the
provision for extension of time is included. We
think it is clear that failure to make the site
available, assuming such to be the case, comes
within purview of the parties and entitled appellee to an extension of time. This it received;
in fact, two of them. There was full compliance
with the provisions of the contract in this respect.
If the instant contract contained no further
provision relative to delays we might hesitate
to refuse appellee damages in addition to extension of time. * * *
"Paragraph 11, contract, goes further and
provides, in addition to an allowance of additional time, that appellee shall have no right of
action against appellant on account of delays
in prosecution of the work. This provision was
known and subscribed to by appellee. While the
application of such restriction may appear harsh,
such was the contract entered into by the parties
and we see no valid reason why it should not
be enforced."
In Charles I. Hosmer, Inc. v. Commonwealth,
302 Mass. 495, 19 N.E.2d 800 (1939), a contractor
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had brought an action against .Massachusetts to recover
the balance due under a written contract for bridge
construction and for damages for delays resulting from
action of the Commonwealth. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, in holding the contractor could
not recover, said:
"The article must be construed in reference
to all the remaining provisions of the written
contract of which it forms a part. * * * The
article in question, must be read in connection
with Clause 3 of the contract, which imposes
upon the contractor the risk of 'all expenses incurred by or in consequence of the suspension,
or discontinuance of the work.' It cannot be
contended that these words were added heedlessly or with the intent that they be ignored.

***

"The contract was executed upon March 5,

1935. The work was to commence immediately

upon the execution of the contract and was to
continue without cessation until completed. The
parties must have contemplated that there might
be delay in commencement of the work and they
agreed that in that event the petitioner should
be given such additional time for completion as
the engineers should determine was just, but it
was specifically provided that the petitioner
should have no claim for damages on account
of such delay. Such a provision negatives any
pecuniary compensation for delay. [Citing
cases] * * *
"The petitioner did not introduce any evidence
showing the reasons or causes for any of .the
delays alleged in its petition. The charactenza-
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tion of the action of the Department of Public
Works as negligent, unreasonable, or due to ind~~ision is not enough to avoid the pertinent prov1s10ns of the contract. The respondent or the
officials in charge of the work are not charged
with arbitrary, capricious, or fraudulent action,
nor with acting in bad faith, or under such gross
mistake as to be tantamount to fraud. * * *"
The Hosmer case was cited with approval in
Coleman Bros. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 307 Mass.
205, 29 N.E.2d 832 (1940); and Charles P. Main, Inc.
v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 347 Mass. ll8,
196 N.E.2d 821 (1964). The latter case dealt with a
design contract under which engineers sought damages
for delay. The contract contained a "no damage" clause,
with respect to which the court said:
"A provision like Article 20 [no damage
clause} seems less appropriate in an engineer's
contract than in a construction contract. Nevertheless, the parties have included it and we must
give it proper effect. 'Ve do not perceive any
adequate basis for concluding that any other
interpretation is more reasonable than the natural meaning of the language. * * *
"We do not find convincing Main's contention
that the Hosmer case is distinguishable because
the contract in that case contained the provision
that the contractor would receive the specified
compensation as 'total compensation for everything * * * done * * * under this contract.' The
Main contract, read as a whole, to us has the
same import. We also do not think that there
is any basis in the language of Article 20 for
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saying that it applies only to the design phase
of the work. If that had been the intention it
should have been so stated."
'
The court's later statement that the contractor "at
least" could not recover for delays "not caused by the
Authority or not unreasonable in length", is not a holding, since the court was reviewing findings of an auditor
that the delays were not in fact caused by the Authority,
and were not unreasonable. There is no suggestion that
the court meant to modify Hos1ner.
In Manerud v. City of Eugene, 62 Ore. 196, 124
Pac. 662 (1912), the plaintiff sought to recover, despite a "no damage" clause, for delays resulting from
a number of causes, among them failure to obtain rights
of way, furnish suitable plans or specifications, set
stakes, and have an engineer on the ground to give
the contractor information and direction from time to
time; ordering frequent changes; mistakes in lines and
grades; neglect in furnishing estimates; and failure to
pay. Plaintiffs contended that cited acts of the city
delayed canal work until mid-November, after which
a flood rendered it impossible to proceed until midApril of the next year, but the court denied recovery,
saymg:
"The essence of plaintiffs' grievance, as stated,
is that the city entirely failed to comply with
part of its contract and was dilatory in what it
did perform. Without going into elaborate detail which would be necessary in a minute consideration of the plaintiffs' numerous objections,

18

we must content ourself with some general observations upon the construction proper to be
given to the contract involved.
"Under its terms mere delay of the city constitut.es no ground for damage. It only extends
the time for the plaintiff to complete the work
within the discretion of the engineer, for the contract itself stipulates thus: 'The Contractor shall
not be entitled to damages on account of delay,
but if such delay be occasioned by the city, the
Contractor shall be entitled to an extension of
time in which to complete the work, to be determined by the engineer.' "
In Ericksen v. Edmonds School Dist. No. 15,
Snohomish County, 13 Wash.2d 398, 125 P.2d 275
( 1942) , a contractor sought damages arising out of
construction on a high school building. The trial court
ruled in favor of the school district and the contractor
appealed. The contract under which action was
brought contained a provision, similar to the one in
the present case, that "the contractor shall not be entitled to any claim for damages on account of hindrances or delays from any cause whatsoever," but
would not be entitled to an extension of time where
delays were caused by an act of God or any act or
omission on the part of the owner. In construing the
"no damage" provision, the Supreme Court of Washington said :
"The decisive question in this case, therefore,
is whether, under a contract containing such a
provision, the contractor should nevertheless be
permitted to maintain an action against the
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owner for breach of contract, upon a showing
that the work was retarded and rendered more
difficult and expensive because of failure on
the part of the supervising architect to make
necessary corrections in the plans and specifications in a timely manner; or whether, on the contrary, the contractor's sole remedy is to seek an
extension of time for the completion of the work

***"

The court recognized the general rule that where
one party delays another in the performance of a contract, there is a breach of an implied agreement, but
added that where
"the contract expressly precludes the recovery of damages by the contractor for delay caused
by the default of the owner, that provision will
be given effect. [Citing numerous cases. J * * *
"The language of such preclusive provision
is, however, usually given a strict construction
because of the harsh results which may flow from
the enforcement thereof. But when it is clear that
a given result comes within the terms of such a
provision, the mere fact that the result is a harsh
one will not prevent the application of the rule.
'Vhether a given contract provision precludes
the recovery of damages in accordance with the
rule just announced depends upon the particular language in which it is cast, the nature of the
default involved, and the various other circumstances of the case.

"The specific provision here in question states
positively that the contractor shall not be entitled
20

to anlJ claim for damages on account of hindrances or delays from any cause whatsoever.

***

. "Wholly aside from his failure (to give notices) , he was in any event precluded by the
expres_s terms of his contract from maintaining
an action for damages resulting from hindrances
and delays. * * *
"The probability of the occurrence of delays
was clearly foreseen by the parties to this action,
as the language of the contract repeatedly discloses, and they specifically provided that the
contractor's remedy therefore should take the
form of an extension of time. * * * " (Emphasis
added.)

Humphreys v. J. B. Michael & Co., Inc, 341
S.\V.2d 229 (Ky. 1960), involved a contract in
which there were a number of provisions relating to
delay. The contractor claimed there was "active interference" on the part of the owner, but the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky held that active interference
could not be established in the absence of an order from
the owner directing the contractor to keep men and
equipment on the job during periods of delay. There
is nothing in the present case to suggest "active interference" such as in Humphreys and in American Bridge
Co. v. State, 245 App. Div. 535, 283 N.Y.S. 577 (1935).
Housing Authority of City of Dallas v. Hubbell,
325 S.W.2d 880, (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), was a prolix
case in which the contractor sought damages for a
great number of delays. The court held that in order
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to recover for delays in the face of a general "no damage" clause, it is necessary to show intentional and wilful acts calculated to cause harm, done with an unlawful
purpose of causing harm, and without right or justifiable cause. It allowed some claims for damages where
the wilfulness issue was properly submitted to the jury,
but reversed others where it was not.
In addition to supporting the other precedents,
the case illustrates the complexity of the problems
sought to be avoided by "no damage" clauses, and points
out that in proving damages for delays a contractor
must offer proof with respect to each delay, its cause,
and the damage resulting from it, not package all the
separate delays together as appellants have tried to do
in this case.
For half a century the United States Supreme
Court has been considering cases involving contract
clauses tending to protect the government against
claims of damages for delays, and quite consistently
has been rejecting contentions that the contract provisions, for one reason or another should not be applied. In an early case, Wells Bros. Co. of New York
vs. United States, 254 U.S. 83, 41 S.Ct. 34, 65 L.Ed.
148 ( 1920), a contractor claimed damages for delays
resulting from a change made by the government in
type of construction material, and suspension of the
work pending adoption of legislation which would affect
the final design of the building. The contract contained
the clause:
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" * * * No claim shall be made or allowed to
the contractor for any damages which may arise
out of any delay caused by the United States."
In holding the contractor could not recover damages for delay, the court said:
"Such language, disassociated as it is from
provisions relating to 'omissions from,' the work
to be done, or 'materials' to be used, cannot be
treated as meaningless and futile and read out
of the contract. Given its plain meaning, it is
fatal to the appellant's claim."
In H. E. Crook Co., Inc. v. United States, 270
U.S. 4, 70 L.Ed. 348, 46 S. Ct. 194 (1926), a contractual provision for an extension of time was construed to be the contractor's only remedy for delays.
Moreover the court held that even though the contract
fixed the contractor's time for performance "very
strictly", this did not impose an obligation on the government with respect to times for performance.
In United States v. Rice, 317 U.S. 61, 87 L.Ed.
53, 63 S.Ct. 120 (1942), the court's examination of
various contract clauses led it to the conclusion that
performance dates set out in the contract were tentative
and subject to modification.
In United States v. Howard P. Foley Co., 329
U.S. 64, 91 L.Ed. 44, 67 S. Ct. 154, (1946), the court
again was asked to construe a contract as not prohibiting damages for delays, but it refused, noting that the
question in all of the cases was whether the government
had obligated itself to pay damages to a contractor
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because of delay in making the work available, and held
again that it had not "for the reasons elaborated in
the Crook and Rice decisions." The court also held that
the obligation placed upon the contractor to perform
within a certain time could not be inverted into a warranty that areas would be available in time to permit
the contractor to so perform.
In none of the above decisions were "the specific
delays" contemplated by the parties any more than in
the instant case, and they cannot be distinguished on
that ground.
Other cases upholding "no damage" clauses are
McDaniel v. Ashton-Mardian Co., 357 F.2d 511, (9
Cir. 1966); American Pipe & Const. Co. v. Harbor
Comt. Co., 51 \Vash. 2d 258, 317 P2d 521 ( 1958) and
Gherardi v. Board of Education, 53 N.J. Super 349,
147 A.2d 535 (1958).
Some courts have held "no damage" clauses, even
some stated in rather broad terms, not to apply to particular fact situations. The New York courts appear
to have gone further than any other jurisdiction permitting recovery despite "no damage" clauses. In
addition to permitting recovery, like other courts if
there has been "active interference," a number of decisions by New York's lower and intermediate courts
have permitted recovery where work has been suspended
for so long a time that a contractor would have been
justified in abandoning the contract. The idea came
from People ex rel. Wells & Newton Co. of New York

24

v. Craig, 232 N.Y. 125, 133 N.E. 419 (1921), which
didn't involve a dispute between the contractor and the
"owner." It was a mandamus action to compel the
eontroller of New York City to pay a claim under
a contract with the Board of Education, the Board
having agreed with the contractor, after a three-year
delay attributable to the Board, to take steps toward
payment of the contractor for delays and have him
complete the contract. The Board's delay was found
to have been so unreasonable as to constitute an abandonment of the contract, thereby authorizing the Board
to enter into a new contract under which it could agree
to pay at a different rate than provided in the old
contract.
The later New York cases have retained the
rationale of the WellY & Newton Co. case and have not
allowed recovery for delays merely because they were
"unreasonable"; the delay must have been so long that
the contractor would have been justified in abandoning
the contract. And this concept implies a long-continued
interruption of work-when substantial contract performance was not going on-not an accumulation of
relatively minor periods converted into an "unreasonable" delay by the use of an adding machine.

Ace Stone, Inc. v. Wayne Township, 47 N.J. 431,
221 A.2d 515 (1966), and McGuire & Hester v. City
& County of San Francisco, 113 Cal.App.2d 186, 247
P.2d 934 (1952), proceeded on yet another theory,
that the delays for which damages were sought were
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not the kinds of delays contemplated by the "no damage" clause. But in each of these cases there were
special facts which motivated the decision.
In Ace Stone, negotiations leading to the contract
were important inasmuch as during them the Township's engineer had represented that easements would
be acquired before notice to proceed was given, and that
the contractor should start with sufficient equipment
to keep three crews busy at three separate sites. In
light of these negotiations and a contract clause which
reasonably could be interpreted as referring only to
delays occurring after the work had begun, the court
held that there was a fact issue as to whether the "no
damage" clause was meant to apply to delays resulting
from an antecedent failure to obtain easements.
In the California case of McGuire & Hester v.
City & County of San Francisco, supra, 113 Cal. App.
2d 186, 247 P.2d 934 (1952), the decision limiting application of the "no damage" clause was based upon a
technical construction of portions of the contract. The
"no damage" clause referred to delays, "whether unavoidable or avoidable," and another paragraph of the
contract defined those terms in such a way that the
delay for which damages were sought did not seem to
be included in either of them.
In Ace Stone and McGuire and Hester there was
room for interpretation, but the "no damage" clause
used in the contract between the joint venture ancl
the Road Commission is stated in the broadest pos-
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sible terms. It says plainly, unequivocally, and without
qualification that the contractor shall not be entitled
to damages for delays "for any cause whatsoever," and
such clauses have usually been applied as written. On
the basis of their vast, well-documented experience,
appellants and their engineers must have known what
delays might be encountered in the design of a complicated interstate highway system. Nevertheless they
agreed to a provision in which they were to be compensated for delays only by extensions of time-not
money.
Many cases dealing with the problems are found
in the annotation, "Validity, construction, and application of 'no damage' clause with respect to delay in
construction contract," 10 ALR 2d 801 et seg. The
cases deal with construction contracts, and those allowing recovery in certain situations might be distinguishable for the reason that contractors are precluded from
utilizing their equipment on other projects during the
delay, while design engineers should be able to shift
their efforts without too many problems. But even without such a distinction, none of the cases has allowed
recovery for a sum total of accumulated separate delays.
II
THERE WAS NO DISPUTE CONCERNING
ANY MATERIAL FACT, AND THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY ENTERED AGAINST THE APPELLANTS.
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Respondent is in agreement with the rule, well
recognized by this court, that a summary judgment
should not be granted where there is any genuine issue
as to any material farct. However, the trial court in
this case decided what is essentially a law question:
the meaning of a written contract which contains an
integration clause to the effect that the writing constitutes the entire agreement ( R. 70, Par IXk). Where
the meaning of such a contract is clear, extrinsic facts
are not needed to find the "intention of the parties".
As stated by this court in Jensen's Used Cars v.
Rice, 7 Utah 2d 276, 323 P.2d 259 ( 1958):
"Elementary it is that in construing contracts
we seek to determine the intentions of the parties.
But it is also elementary and of extreme practical importance that we hold contracting parties
to their clear and understandable language deliberately committed to writing and endorsed
by them as signatories thereto. 'Vere this not
so business, one with another among our citizens,
would be relegated to the chaotic, and the basic
purpose of the law to supply enforceable rules 1
of conduct for the maintenance and improvement of an orderly society's welfare and progress would find itself impotent. It is not un- '
reasonable to hold one responsible for language
which he himself espouses. Such language is the
only implement he gives us to fashion a determination as to the intentions of the parties.
Under such circumstances we should not be
required to embosom any request that we ignore
that very language. This is as it should be. The
rule excluding matters outside the four cornen
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of a clear, understandable document, is a fair
one, and one's contentions concerning his intent
should. extend
no further than his own clear ex,,
press10n.
If there is any ambiguity in the contract, the ambiguity does not appear in the "no damage" clause
itself, which purports to cover all delays, from whatever causes. Appellants, therefore, must claim an
ambiguity arises out of other contractual provisions
and the circumstances surrounding negotiation of the
eontract. But such a claim, because of the undisputed
facts, cannot create a genuine issue as to any fact material to construction of the contract. Appellants have
stipulated that their case does not have elements of
fraud, malicious, or wilful acts stated by this court to
be necessary in Russell v. Bothwell & Swaner Co. et al.,
supra, 57 Utah 362, 194 Pac. ll09. Their main contentions are (I) that the delays, cumulatively, were
"unreasonable," and ( 2) that the delays were not of
the kind contemplated by the parties.

But there was no long interruption of work which
would justify abandonment of the contract, as there
must be even under the decisions of the courts of New
York, which seems to be the only state embracing the
doctrine of "reasonableness."
The parol evidence rule precludes appellants from
proving by extrinsic evidence that the delays intended
to be covered by the "no damage" clause were anything
other than "any delay or hindrance, of any cause whatsoever." But assuming, for the sake of argument, that
29

extrinsic facts may be considered, appellants l.uu.t lWt
suggested the exi~tence of any facts which would support the interpretation they espouse. The court would
be required to look at the entire contract and the negotiations between the parties to determine the kinds of
delays contemplated by the "no damage" clause.
The appellants' proposal, and the contract, establish
that delays encountered were the result of problems
the parties knew about and were concerned about.
Consider the following undisputed facts:
The joint venture was experienced and knowledgeable in the design and construction of interstate highway systems. It must have anticipated the kinds of
delays that might affect its progress.
The proposal submitted by the joint venture
promised to complete the project "within nine months
after notice to proceed, provided there is not more than
a two-week interval between submission of the vario1tS
phases of design and approval of the above designs
by the Utah Road Commission and the Bureau of Public
Roads." (Emphasis added.)
The final fee was stated to be 3.45% or the estimated construction cost, and there was not even a hint
that the fee was conditional upon the speed of approval
or the date of completion.
The agreement entered into by the parties referred
to the inadequacy of the engineering staff of the Road
Commission; and that the engineer was qualified, ready,
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'

aLlc, and willing to assist the Road Commission in
designing the project.

The agreement expressly provided that decisions
with respect to plans and designs would be subject
to approval of the Bureau of Public Roads.
Modifications in the plans and specifications "from
time to time" were contemplated by Item II of the
coutract, "Control of the Work."
All surveys, designs, plans, schedules, progress
and supervision were to be subject to the approval of
the Director of Highways.
The engineering fee provided in the contract was
for "all services" and was to be "final compensation"
for the services provided in the contract."
Contractual provision for extra payments related
only to work "beyond the scope" of the contract work,
and to changes in connection with work already satisfactorily performed, without mention of delays.
Finally, if contemporaneous construction is relevant, the joint venture asked for and received extensions
of time for performance, the last request having been
made on June 29, 1960, (R. 98), more than 18 months
later than date by which appellants now claim the contract should have been completed.
Despite its own proposal and the express contract
provisions the joint venture now contends that there
are some facts, somewhere, to establish that the delays
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were "unreasonable" and not contemplated by the
parties. \¥ e admit the contract took much longer to
perform than contract schedule provided. But appellants have not pointed to anything that occurred during
the negotiations, such as was referred to in the Ace
Stone, case, which misled the joint venture; or to any
unusual circumstances; nor to any contemporaneous
construction by the parties that would help them. There
is nothing in any of the affidavits submitted by the
appellants, nothing in the memorandwn itself (many
of the assertions in which are supported by affidavits)
which would bring the case within the operation of any
of the cases relied upon by appellants.
The parties contracted specifically with reference
to the duties of the Road Commission, among which
was the duty to see that plans and drawings were
returned to the joint venture within a reasonable time '
"so as not to interrupt or delay the work" of the joint
venture. The possibility of delay from such a cause was 1
anticipated in the contract, yet the joint venture also
agreed that in event of delays, from any cause what- 1
soever, a claim for damages would not be made. Delay
problems described in the contract must have been ,
understood by the parties to be within the realm of
possibility.

III

THE STATE OF UTAH IS NOT OBLIGATED TO PAY INTEREST ON ANY
AMOUNTS FOUND TO BE DUE.
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Inasmuch as the trial court disposed of the case
on the ground that there was no valid claim against
the Road Commission, the obligation of the State of
Utah to pay interest on a claim such as this was not
ruled upon by the trial court. It may be hypothetical
here.

That a state's obligation to pay interest is limited
is well-recognized. As stated in 49 Am. J ur., States,
Territories and Dependencies, § 75, p. 286:
"It is a well settled rule that a state is not
liable for a payment of interest on its debts
unless so bound by an act of the legislature or
by a lawful contract of its administrator or
executive officers made within the scope of their
duly constituted authority. The state is liable
to pay interest only as it has bound itself by
contract to do so. * * * The rule applies to all
kinds of obligations of and claims against the
state. * * * "
And in § 15 of the same article:
"Since the state is not liable for the payment
of interest on claims against it unless it has assumed such a liability, it does not become bound
for a payment of interest under a general statute
imposing liability for interest."
Utah seems never to have passed directly on the
question of the obligation to pay interest under a general
statute.
Only once has a case involving interest payment
by the State of Utah faced our Supreme Court. How-
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ever, in State v. Danielson, 247 P.2d 900, 122 Utah 220 ,
the question of liability of the State for interest was
not the issue, the parties having agreed that the defendant was entitled to recover interest in a condemnation action. The court cited Oregon S.L.R. Company
v. Jones et al., 29 Utah 147, 80 P. 732, and Salt Lake
and U. R. v. Schramm, 56 Utah 53, 189 Pac. 90, as
a basis for this liability. These latter cases established
liability for interest in condemnation actions but did
not involve the State or a public agency.
The closest cases which might favor plaintiff in
its claim for interest herein are Baker Lumber Cornpany v. A. A. Clark Company, et al., 53 Utah 336,
178 Pac. 764, and Auerbach v. Salt Lake County, 23
Utah 103, 63 Pac. 907. These cases involved a school
district and a county. However, in both instances they
also involved interest-bearing warrants in which the
school district and county agreed to pay interest to the
obligees.
As suggested in appellants' brief, some decisions
have held the state to be liable for interest. But most
do not. One such case is Culver v. Commonwealth, 348
Pa. 472, 35 A.2d 64 ( 1944), in which a general interest
statute was held not to apply to the state in a condemnation proceeding.
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CONCLUSION
Appellants' desire to obtain additional revenue is
understandable, but it shouldn't be fulfilled in such a
way as to make scriveners psychotic. If various specific
eauses of delay had been catalogued in an appendix
to the contract, appellants no doubt would have been
able to find some delay that wasn't on the list. The
eontract having referred to all delays, "of any cause
whatsoever," appellants contend that it should only
apply to delays "contemplated by the parties", and
should not be held to mean what it plainly says.
If "no damage" clauses are valid (which they are
uniformly held to be), and in a given case the partie~
want to provide the exclusive remedy with respect tc
all delays, some language should be available by which
they can do. Must they add an "absolutely"?

There is no rule of law, morality, or public policy
that requires appellants to be paid for delays in performance, when they had solemnly agreed that such
delays were to be compensated for solely by an extension of time. This is particularly true where their proposal to the Road Commission, by its own express
terms, made delays material only to appellants' time
of performance.
is

The contract is written. It is not ambiguous. There
no genuine issue as to any material fact. And the
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contract precludes recovery by the appellants of any
damages for delays. The judgment of the District Court
of Salt Lake County should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. IIANSEN
Attorney General of Utah
BRYCE E. ROE
OLLIE McCULLOCH
Special Assistant Attorney Generals
510 American Oil Building

Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Defendants and
Respondents

I
36

